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I examine two central questions bearing on the optimal relative taxation of employment and self-
employment income using the 2009 Polish reform. Firstly, I estimate the degree of substitution on the 
extensive margin between the employment and self-employment tax bases, as well as the intensive-
margin elasticities for these tax bases separately. The baseline estimates of the intensive-margin 
elasticities are around 0.2 for the employed and around 0.7 for the self-employed. Secondly, I 
characterize optimal non-linear employment and self-employment tax schedules in a theoretical 
model, finding rationale for taxation of self-employment income at lower marginal and total tax rates. 
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The question of the relative tax treatment of different tax bases, and of the self-employment
and employment tax bases in particular, is a pressing one for policymakers. It is also a
significant topic of political debate. In early 2017, for instance, the Conservative gov-
ernment in Britain made a decision to increase national insurance contributions for the
self-employed to bring them more in line with the rates faced by workers, justifying the
proposal by arguing that it would introduce more equitable tax treatment between the
employment and self-employment. However, it was subsequently retracted by the gov-
ernment in the face of widespread controversy.
A central result of public economics is that under certain conditions (Feldstein, 1995),
the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) – the degree to which declared taxable income falls
with increasing tax rates – is a sufficient statistic to measure the efficiency of taxation. 1
All other things being equal, a higher elasticity of taxable income is found to imply a
greater efficiency loss and hence a lower optimal marginal tax rate. By implication, if
self-employment income exhibits a higher taxable income elasticity than employment,
it should ceteris paribus be taxed at lower marginal tax rates. Indeed, previous studies,
such as Kopczuk (2015) or Saez (2010), suggest that self-employment income has a higher
ETI than employment income, suggesting a prima facie case for taxing self-employment
income at a lower marginal rate than income from employment.
However, it is also understood that a different treatment of income categories by
the tax system may lead taxpayers to move between these categories. For instance,
Gordon and Slemrod (2000) argue that the response to the Reagan 1986 tax cuts in
the personal income tax base may have been driven mainly by taxpayers shifting from
the corporate tax base. Such responses to tax reforms, which have been termed fiscal
externalities (Saez et al., 2012), create further efficiency losses, and have dominated the
policy discussion surrounding relative rate of taxation between employment and self-
employment. Crawford and Freedman (2010) argue, for instance, that tax rates for the
employed and the self-employed should be equalized, precisely on the grounds of reducing
distortionary substitution between the two bases. As a result, there is a trade-off between
adjusting marginal tax rates in response to higher elasticities among some categories on
the one hand and creating incentives to switch tax categories on the other. The precise
quantitative significance of these trade-offs has not been ascertained, however, neither in
terms of estimating relevant parameters, nor their implications for optimal tax schedules. 2
This paper seeks to address both the empirical and theoretical challenges in the con-
1Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012) provide a comprehensive survey. The literature highlights three
factors as being important for finding optimal tax rates: the ETI, preferences for redistribution and the
mass of individuals located at different points in the income distribution.
2Higher elasticities for workers may also incentivise the social planner to push individuals out of
self-employment, and thereby be able to subject them to higher marginal tax rates.
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text of employment and self-employment by taking advantage of a tax reform episode
which occurred in Poland in 2009. In particular, I first estimate the parameters govern-
ing the efficiency cost of taxes in the presence of tax base shifting between these two tax
bases. I then feeds these into a theoretical model of optimal taxation to work out quantita-
tive implications in a stylized framework. Since the Polish tax reform altered the relative
difference in the tax burdens between an employed individual and a self-employed indi-
vidual with the same income, it allows the estimation of fiscal externalities between these
two tax bases. Since the fraction of self-employed individuals who also report employment
income is small (about a quarter of the total) as a first I focus on fiscal externalities on
the extensive margin, whereby individuals switch entirely between self-employment and
employment activity.3 This is to my knowledge the first paper to estimate such extensive-
margin externalities and asses their implications for optimal taxation. The reform also
allows the estimation of traditional intensive-margin ETIs separately for the two main
types of income under consideration, alongside the fiscal externalities. Looking at the
intensive and extensive-margin responses to tax reform together within one tax system
here is natural, since both matter for determining optimal relative rates rates of taxation.
Interestingly, I find stable own-elasticities of employment income across the income
distribution in the 0.2-0.3 range. Own-elasticities of business income are higher, in the 0.5-
0.7 range, although it is more difficult to estimate how stable these are across the income
distribution because of small sample size. There are also non-trivial responses occurring
at the extensive margin: a 10,000z l per annum ($2,672 as of May 20174) change in the
relative tax burden between the two tax bases increases the probability of a taxpayer filing
linear business income, as opposed to progressive employment income, by 3.75 percentage
points. The estimates allow us to find the contributions of the extensive margin to changes
in the deadweight losses at the time of the 2009 reforms in Poland at 7% of the total.
I incorporate these empirical results into a model of general non-linear taxation of em-
ployees and the self-employed. In particular, I am interested in the implications of this
behaviour for the design of socially optimal tax schedules. Lower marginal tax rates at a
given point in the optimal tax schedule will lead to a higher tax differential higher up the
schedule. As has already been mentioned, the phenomenon of individuals transitioning
between tax bases to take advantage of favourable tax differentials introduces another
distortion which acts in the opposite direction against a tax system which introduces large
differences in the levels of taxation of self-employment and employment. Ultimately, it
is a quantitative question whether an optimal tax schedule is likely to feature differential
3In an extension of the theoretical model in section 4.2 of the Online Appendix, I allow there to
be fiscal externalities on both the intensive and extensive margins. In this scenario, individuals with
both types of income adjust the relative amount of income declared in each tax base and for them an
intensive-margin cross-elasticity becomes an addition to the optimal-tax formulae. Since the majority of
taxpayers report either one or the other type of income, however, I here focus on the extensive-margin
and leave a quantitative exploration of the richer model for future work.
4z l denotes the Polish currency, z loty.
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tax treatment (in terms of marginal and/or total tax rates) for self-employment relative
to employment. The approach is to augment the standard model of optimal taxation
analyzed in detail by Mirrlees (1971), Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001), among others.
Specifically, I introduce an additional tax base, the self-employment tax base, with pos-
sible switching on the extensive margin between the two, following Scheuer (2014). The
results suggest that, for the calibrations employed here using the Polish dataset and es-
timates, self-employment should be taxed at a marginal rate lower than employment by
around 10 to 20 percentage points for most of the income distribution. The presence of
extensive margin transitions only moderately offsets the gains from lower marginal tax
rates on self-employment income.5
The paper links to several strands in the public finance literature. Most closely related
is Kopczuk (2015), who examines business income elasticities around the introduction of
the linear tax option for business income in 2004 in Poland using a methodology also
based on joint filing with a spouse. This study is complementary to his - a similar identi-
fication strategy is applied to a sample of business owners for intensive-margin elasticities.
However, his paper does not examine the extensive-margin implications of differential tax-
ation of tax bases. Kleven and Schultz (2014), Alstadster and Jacob (2016), Harju and
Matikka (2016a) and Harju and Matikka (2016b) all examine cross-elasticities between
business and employment income using reforms in Scandinanvian countries. However,
they focus purely on intensive-margin responses, which are unlikely to be the dominant
response as only a relatively small fraction of the self-employed also report employment
income. From a theoretical perspective, Kleven et al. (2009) is a seminal contribution fo-
cusing on the joint taxation of a household involving a primary taxpayer and the spouse.
The decision whether to work or not of a taxpayer’s spouse in this paper shares many
similarities with the choice to switch tax bases here. Scheuer (2012) applies an analogous
framework to Kleven et al. (2009) to examine optimal non-linear taxation in environ-
ment with an extensive-margin occupational choice between employment and business.
However, the calibrations of the relevant parameters employed do not incorporate the
different elasticities between the tax bases and, moreover, the parameters driving the
extensive-margin responses to taxation are not founded in estimates. Therefore, I regard
this paper as complementary to his theoretical analysis.
The paper also deals with a number of methodological challenges which surrounds the
identification of intensive-margin ETI parameters, and as such also makes a methodolog-
5 As Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) and Kopczuk (2005) have pointed out, parameters such as the
elasticity of taxable income are not necessarily fixed, but depend on other policy considerations such as
tax exemptions, the strictness of tax-enforcement and other contingent institutional features. This implies
that policies such as tightening the rules around switching between employment and self-employment or
enhancing third-party reporting for self-employment may be efficient options for policymakers. Thus, it
should be borne in mind that the above conclusions are made, taking the tax enforcement and reporting
rules as given. Incorporating non-tax changes in an analysis optimal tax policy in the context of self-
employment is an important complementary avenue of research.
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ical contribution. The dominant empirical approach has been to use tax reforms which
create exogenous variation in marginal tax rates for some sub-groups of taxpayers while
leaving them unchanged for others. Classic papers in this spirit include Feldstein (1995),
Gruber and Saez (2002) and Kopczuk (2005). It is unclear whether these existing studies
adequately controlled for the changes in taxable income which would have occurred any-
way, even in the absence of tax reforms. Since tax reforms are usually concentrated in
certain sub-sections of the income distribution, researchers have tended to assume that
the pattern of income growth across the income distribution is stable over time, absent
reforms. This, however, may not hold in practice. For instance, business cycle factors
affect some parts of the income distribution more than others, income inequality trends
may also change over time and, finally, people at different points in the distribution and
different types of income may have different elasticities (Saez et al., 2012).
The Polish reform episode permits an identification strategy for intensive-margin elas-
ticities which does not require the assumption of stable income dynamics over time across
the income distribution. Specifically, the Polish system gives the option to file jointly with
spouses. Joint filing with a lower-income spouse may allow an individual to enter a lower
income tax bracket than under single filing, while an individual with the same income
but a higher-income spouse may be forced to remain in a higher tax bracket. It is the
latter taxpayers who experienced a large cut in MTRs as a result of Poland’s 2009 tax
reforms, while the former did not. I thus obtain a treatment and a control group which is
independent of the position in the taxpayer’s own position in the income distribution. For
estimating extensive-margin elasticities, I rely both on an analogous estimation strategy,
where individuals with spouses provide a control group to individuals transitioning to
and from the linear business tax base, as well as transitions around income brackets. 6
The paper is related to a number of more recent studies which have attempted to
address some of the drawbacks of the classic approach in the empirical ETI literature
(e.g. Burns and Ziliak (2017) and Weber (2014)). An important paper in this regard
is Weber (2014), who argues that the traditional instruments in the spirit of Gruber-
Saez are correlated with the idiosyncratic term under reasonable assumptions about the
dynamics of the earnings process. Her proposed solution is to use longer lags of income
in predicting changes in marginal tax rates, which she argues are not correlated with
idiosyncratic earnings components with limited memory. When applied to the Polish
case, I show that the Weber (2014) methodology does produce estimates closer to those
produced by the method proposed here, especially at short horizons. Nonetheless, it still
6 The main assumption for identifying intensive-margin elasticities used here is that, absent reforms,
changes in the taxable income declared by a taxpayer are independent of his or her spouse’s income
level, once I condition for the taxpayer’s own base-year income. Due to the availability of several years
where no reforms occurred, I can verify its validity by conducting placebo tests something which is
unfortunately rarely done in the literature (Kopczuk (2015) is a notable exception). Likewise, extensive-
margin estimates are validated by placebo estimates in non-reform years.
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produces somewhat divergent results and, additionally, the discrepancies increase the
longer is the time horizon taken. Fundamentally, this alternative method still relies on
an extrapolation of the pattern of earnings dynamics from past to the reform year and
in this regard may still have limited relevance in situations where there is time-variation
in earnings dynamics across the income distribution.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives background
information on the Polish tax system and the 2009 tax reform. Section 3 develops a model
of tax reporting in an environment with multiple tax bases and demonstrates how fiscal
externalities affect the formulae for the deadweight loss (DWL) of tax reforms. Section 4
outlines the dataset. Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical results on the intensive and
extensive margin. Section 7 applies these results to calculate the DWL of the Polish tax
reform. In Section 8, I present the calibration of the model of optimal taxation based on
the empirical results in Sections 5 and 6. The paper concludes in Section 9.
2 Background: The 2009 Polish Tax Reform
The basic Polish personal income tax system has a progressive structure. For most
individuals, income from standard employment contracts, non-standard contracts, such
as commissions, as well as self-employment income, are aggregated and subjected to a
progressive personal income tax schedule. Before 2009, the schedule had three tax bands
with increasing marginal tax rates: 19%, 30% and 40%, and a small tax-free allowance at
the bottom. However, unlike many other tax systems as of 2003 the Polish tax code gave
taxpayers with self-employment income a choice regarding how it is taxed. Individuals
with such income are given the option of having self-employment income taxed separately
according to a linear 19% tax schedule.7 The linear schedule deprives them of several
tax advantages, including the tax-free allowance, the ability to claim deductions and
the ability to share tax liability with a spouse. Income from assets is taxed separately
according to a linear tax of 19%. The additional optional linear tax was granted on
top of a number of advantages of reporting self-employment income. For instance, as
is the case in many other countries, self-employed individuals can deduct business costs
from their revenue, and deduct past losses in years with positive profits. Formally, an
individual cannot be self-employed if they satisfy all three of the following conditions:
1) those commissioning the work bear responsibility for the business activity towards
third-parties 2) the place and time of work are determined by those commissioning the
work and 3) business risk for the activity is borne by those commissioning the work.
7Self-employment income is here defined as income from unincorporated businesses which act as pass-
through entities (I otherwise refer to it as “business income”). Income from incorporated businesses is
taxed separately, once under the Corporation Income Tax (CIT), which is 19%, and subsequently again
under a 19% personal tax which applies to capital gains.
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In principle, therefore, there is considerable scope for switching to self-employment by
previously employed individuals.
If a taxpayer is married, they have the option of reducing their tax liability through
joint filing, a feature the Polish tax system shares with many other tax systems, such as
the US system. Income is summed over the taxpayer and the spouse: if the sum falls
below twice a bracket threshold, a lower marginal rate is applied to the entire income,
even if one of the taxpayers individually would have crossed the bracket and had been
subject to a higher marginal rate. The averaging of incomes always creates an incentive
to file jointly if the taxpayer would have otherwise been in a higher bracket than the
spouse, or vice versa. Single parents can similarly share tax liability with their child, who
acts as if they were a non-earning spouse.
The 2009 tax reform cut the the marginal tax rate in the bottom bracket by 1% and
extended this tax bracket to cover what was previously the middle tax bracket, resulting
in a 12% fall in the marginal tax rate for what was previously the middle tax bracket.
The top rate was also reduced from from 40% to 32%. The reform therefore ‘flattened’
the tax schedule, resulting in a schedule with just two tax bands of 18% and 32%. The
changes in marginal tax rates and thresholds are summarized in Table 1. Crucially, since
the optional linear tax schedule for self-employment income remained unchanged, the
reform also had the effect of reducing the differential in tax rates between the progressive
and linear schedules, especially for individuals who would have previously fallen in the
second and third tax brackets in the progressive schedule.8
In the periods 2004-2006 and 2008-2012, the tax brackets remained frozen in nominal
terms, thus implying many individuals would have experienced a transition into higher
tax brackets due to inflation and secular income growth (so-called ‘bracket-creep’). No
significant changes to the tax base occurred in my sample period, and available deductions
remained fairly constant. This implies that the definition of taxable income remained
fairly stable, and thus merits focus on taxable income as the variable of interest (other
studies have tended to focus on broad income, which has often been seen as the measure
less sensitive to changes in definitions of the tax base). Significant real-GDP growth
occurred in 2007-2008, with a slight slowdown in 2009. This is problematic to the extent
that changes in growth differentially affect different regions of the income distribution.
However, it will be shown that the identification strategy presented allows us to control
8Since the identification strategy used in this paper relies on joint filing by spouses, it is important
to note that following the reform, the combinations of income for which there were positive gains from
joint filing shrunk. For instance, if the original filer was in the middle tax bracket with a spouse in the
lower tax bracket, following the reform there was no longer a gain from filing jointly (although there was
no financial loss to doing so either). I do indeed see a fall in the proportion of individuals in the second
bracket reporting with a spouse from 65.3% to 61.4%, while I do not see a similar fall for those in the
third bracket. I largely abstract from this issue, and it will be seen that the population of those who
continued to file jointly throughout the period continues to serve as a source of suitable treatment and
control groups.
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Table 1: Marginal tax rates and tax bands (in z l).
Marginal tax rate 2007 2008 2009-12






for business cycle effects. A final confounding factor consists of the lagged effects of the
2003 reform, which introduced the option of the linear business schedule. The first year
in the dataset, 2004, was the first year following the introduction of the linear tax. Until
2005 I see a continuing year-on-year increase in the proportion of individuals filing the
linear tax, and thereafter the take-up rate for this tax stabilizes in 2006 and 2007. Thus,
I will exclude 2005 from the analysis of extensive-margin transitions.
A possible confounding event to the 2009 reform was a cut in the level of social security
contributions for the financing of the disability insurance programme which occurred in
2007-2008. This is a contribution paid proportionately on employment income, but is
a fixed rate for self-employed individuals equivalent to the rate paid by those employed
full-time on the minimum wage. If I treat these social security contributions as a tax, this
change would have caused a net increase in the tax gains from self-employment relative
to employment at the lower end of the income distribution in 2007-2008 (and the reverse
upper in the income distribution). On the extensive margin, my approach is to use the
self-employed subject to progressive taxation as a control group for the self-employed
subject to the linear schedule, or alternatively to examine changes along a band around a
tax kink. This ought to control for the social security changes, as both groups would have
been similarly in 2007-2008. On the intensive margin, the main identification strategy for
the effect of 2009 tax reforms relies on assignment into treatment/control based spousal
income, and controls for base-year income. Again, this should control for the effects of
the 2007-2008 social-security changes, which were independent of spousal income.
It is important to note that the transition from employment to self-employment and
linear taxation was subjected to some restrictions. For instance, a year had to elapse
between a taxpayer being employed by a company, and subsequently being hired by
that same company as a business-owner. I therefore focus on two-year differences when
examining transitions between employment and self-employment.9
9The question of how optimal tax policy could in principle be affected if individual-specific fixed costs
could be influenced by e.g. changes in reporting requirements is left for future work.
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3 Motivation
A central feature of the 2009 reform was that it altered the relative incentives to file in-
come under the linear business schedule and the progressive (business and employment)
schedules. In this section, I outline a theoretical model of reporting behaviour which de-
scribes how intensive elasticities interact with extensive-margin income-shifting responses
in determining the marginal deadweight loss (DWL) of tax reforms. Based on the pre-
dictions of this model, I will arrive at the empirical statistics sufficient for the calculation
of the DWL. A discussion of how these extensive margins affect optimal tax formulae is
left until Section 8.
3.1 DWL under Linear Taxation
In the model, I postulate the existence of two tax bases subject to linear taxation, as well
as a fixed costs of reporting self-employment income for taxpayers. I assume there exists a
mass of individuals, each characterized by a parameter θ influencing the marginal cost of
declaring an extra unit of taxable income of either type, and a parameter φ, which is the
fixed cost of declaring business income instead of employment income. The cumulative
distribution functions in the population are F (θ) and Gθ(φ), with marginal densities f(θ)
and gθ(φ), where the distribution of fixed costs is allowed to depend on θ. Individuals
are assumed to have a quasi-linear utility of the form
u(c, l, b; θ) = c − 1{b = 0, l > 0}.ψL(l/θ) − 1{b > 0, l = 0}.(ψB(b/(ω̃θ)) − φ) (1)
where c is consumption, b is the amount of business income declared, l is the amount
of labour income declared, and 1{b = 0, l > 0} as well as 1{b > 0, l = 0} are dummy
variables equal to 1 if, respectively, any positive employment or self-employment income
are declared. The function ψK(.), where K ∈ {L,B} indicates the tax-base, is convex
and implies increasing marginal costs of producing an extra unit of taxable income as
taxable income increases.
It is worth mentioning possible interpretations of this specification of utility. This
fixed cost φ can encompass administrative costs, attitudes towards risk, and preferences
towards the flexibility of self-employment (or, alternatively, easier access to evasion op-
portunities). The parameters θ and ω̃θ can be interpreted as the hourly wage rates for
an hour worked as an employee or as a self-employed individual, respectively, in a stan-
dard model of labour supply. The cost functions ψK(.) presented above can then be
interpreted as representing the increasing cost of additional hours-of-work. However, it
is easy to broaden the model above to include situations where an individual has other
margins of response, however.10 Since the function ψK(.) is linked to the elasticity of
10For instance, Chetty (2009) shows that in a model where an individual chooses hours to work, with
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taxable income, and since previous studies suggest that the elasticities of taxable income
are different for employment and self-employment, these are allowed to be different in the
above model. The quasi-linear utility implies an absence of income effects, and has been
previously used by Diamond (1998).11
In this simplified model, individuals choose between employment and business income,
but cannot report both. As has already been mentioned, a minority of around a quarter
of the self-employed also report employment income. The budget constraint for each
individual is just c ≤ (1−τL)l if the individual earns employment income, and c ≤ (1−τB)b
if the individual earns business income. On the intensive margin, conditional on being
in a tax base, individuals will choose to report the level of income 1 − τK = ψ′K(k/θ)/θ,
where k ∈ {l, b} denotes the level of income declared in a tax base. The solution to this
yields the reported income supply functions l(θ) and b(θ). I may additionally define the
indirect utility for each tax base, excluding fixed costs, as
vK(θ) = (1 − τK)k(θ) − ψ
K(k(θ)/θ).
An individual of type θ chooses the business tax base if the gain in indirect utility
relative to the employment tax base exceeds the difference in associated fixed costs. The
tax base choice for the individual is therefore determined by whether or not their fixed
costs exceed the following threshold:
φ̃(θ) = vB(θ) − vL(θ)
Consequently, the proportion of individuals of type θ reporting in the business tax base
is simply Gθ(φ̃), and the proportion in the employment tax base is simply 1 − Gθ(φ̃).
Let us suppose that the government increases the marginal tax rate on labour income
τL by a small amount dτL, with no change in the marginal tax rate on business income
τB. The reform has two effects on tax revenue. The first is a “mechanical” increase in
tax revenue from employees as a result of taxpayers with wage income facing a higher







dFθ × dτL (2)
This is the projected increase in tax revenue from all taxpayers with employment income,
absent any behavioural response.
increasing marginal costs of hours, but also makes a choice about not reporting a proportion of income,
which is costly, the welfare analysis of tax reforms presented below carries through. The advantage of
using the simple framework above is that, as will be seen, elasticity parameters map straightforwardly
onto coefficients in the utility function.
11Preliminary analysis suggests that income effects are in fact quantitatively small in the sample of
taxpayers under consideration.
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The second effect of the reform is to cause a behavioural response which changes the
reported income of taxpayers in the employment tax base. In the model proposed here,
the behavioural response will have both an intensive-margin and an extensive-margin
component. The intensive-margin response is the one traditionally emphasized in the ETI
literature (see for instance Saez et al. (2012)): the change dτLwill induce a taxpayer of type
θ to reduce the level of reported employment income by ∂l(θ)
∂τL
dτL. This can be re-expressed
as − l(θ)
(1−τL)





is the standard elasticity of employment
income for individual θ with respect to the marginal tax rate on employment income.12
The total amount of income lost through this response is the integral of the change in










However, for a taxpayer of type θ, the tax reform will also increase the threshold value
of fixed costs at which it becomes optimal to switch from employment to business. This
will induce a proportion of individuals with fixed costs below this value to switch to the










We may note that the change in the threshold for switching is therefore proportional
to the change in the total quantity of tax paid on the employment income declared
by an individual. The density of individuals of type θ who are induced to switch as




× l(θ)dτL. For each individual in em-
ployment who switches to the business tax base, the net loss in tax revenue will be
equal to ΔTL,B(θ) = τLl(θ) − τBb(θ). Hence, for type θ, the amount of revenue lost
on the extensive margin is the density of individuals induced to switch, multiplied by





l(θ)ΔTL,B(θ)× dτL. This term is novel, and captures the fiscal externality arising
out of the income-shifting occurring on the extensive margin. It is a weighted average
over all types θ by the probability density of each type, f(θ), and is increasing in the




l(θ), as well as the difference
in the total tax burden between the two tax bases, ΔTL,B(θ).
Summing up both the intensive and extensive margin, the total change in tax revenue
















dFθ × dτL (3)






dFθ as the aggregate elasticity of employ-
ment income to the marginal tax rate on employment, weighted by the level of employ-
12Since there are no income effects present, this is both the compensated and uncompensated elasticity.
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dFθ is the extensive-margin response.13
The total change in tax revenue dR due to the tax reform is just the sum of the mechanical
and behavioural responses, dR = dM + dB.
The two terms accounting for the behavioural response are exactly equal to the
marginal deadweight burden of the increase in the tax rate. This is a well-known result of
the envelope theorem: due to the optimizing behaviour of taxpayers, the behavioural re-
sponse to a small tax change creates no additional welfare loss aside from the mechanical
effect. In the context of the above model, this is true both of responses at the extensive
margins as well as the intensive margin. Individuals induced to switch to the business tax
base are at the point of indifference between the two tax bases, and so incur no additional
welfare loss due to switching. This is what allows us to measure the utility loss of the
tax change in monetary terms purely in terms of the mechanical effect dM . Since tax
revenue collected is dR = dM + dB, which is smaller than the utility loss dM as a result
of the reform, the difference between the two,−dB, represents the extra amount lost in
utility over and above the revenue collected.14
At the optimum, absent distributional preferences, the policymaker would attempt to
equalise the marginal DWL between the two tax bases. If the elasticity of taxable income
is higher for self-employment than for employment (as is found by some studies, such
as Kopczuk (2015) and Saez (2010)), and there were no extensive-margin responses, the
DWL formulae would imply that the marginal tax rate should be lower on the business-
income tax base than on the employment tax base. However, the above analysis also
implies that this motive would have to be tempered by the degree of switching on the
extensive-margin due to the differential in total tax rates between the two tax bases.
The above analysis demonstrates that the presence of an extensive-margin response
increases the size of this additional deadweight burden relative to a model with just an
intensive-margin response.15 It also suggests which statistics are sufficient to evaluate the





, which is just the elasticity of the fraction in self-employment with respect to











14The same analysis can be performed for the effects of a small increase in the business marginal
tax rate dτB , with analogous terms reflecting the intensive and extensive-margin behavioural responses.
The marginal deadweight burden of an increase in the business tax rate would now be increasing in the
elasticity of business income ε̄B . Specifically, the formula showing the change in revenue due to a small

























Presuming the marginal tax rate on employment income is initially higher, there is a difference in that
the extensive-margin behavioural response is positive, i.e. attenuates the DWL. This is because with
an initially higher tax rate τB , switching away from self-employment towards employment generate a
positive fiscal externality.
15Piketty and Saez (2012) argue that extensive-margin responses do not alter the standard formulae for
DWL. This is true in their model if the extensive-margin responses are between reporting some taxable
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formula for DWL, and which we can in principle estimate. These would be the size of
the aggregate tax elasticity of the employment tax base, corresponding to the aggregate
intensive-margin response to the reform, as well as an estimate of the total mass of taxable
income lost as a result of switches on the extensive margin. In the online appendix, I use
an equation very similar to (3) to approximate the DWL to a tax reform with multiple
tax brackets such as the 2009 Polish tax reform.
As has been pointed out by Chetty (2009), the elasticities of taxable income are
sufficient for the welfare evaluation of tax reforms only if a number of assumptions hold.
For instance, there has to be a lack transfers as a result of evasion to other individuals
by the taxpayer, or a lack of optimisation frictions. In the absence of such frictions, and
with only a private cost of hiding a share of income, a simple extension of the baseline
model in Appendix H discusses how in the presence of such evasion responses elasticities
of taxable income remain a sufficient statistic.16
4 Data
The dataset used for the empirical work is a proprietary dataset obtained from the Polish
Ministry of Finance. It comprises a balanced panel of about a million Polish taxpayers
over the years 2004 to 2012. This is a random sample selected out of the population of all
taxpayers who reported any taxable income at least once in this period, and as a result is
subject to attrition and replacement. The dataset contains information on individuals and
spouses filing according to the progressive schedule, as well as self-employment individuals
who chose to file self-employment income according to the linear schedule. In the latter
case, individuals are legally prevented from filing jointly with a spouse and, as a result,
I am unable to predict whether or not they have a spouse in practice. As with most tax
return data, demographic information is limited, and contains only the taxpayer’s age
and gender. The number of children can be inferred only to the extent that the taxpayer
claims deductions only available to those with children. Any deductions claimed by the
individuals can be observed, as can be their county of residence.
The dataset allows us to link individuals who report both linear self-employment
income and some employment income, and also to observe whether they report either
self-employment or employment income, or both, if they report under the progressive
schedule. Since less than a third of business owners report both employment and business
income and reporting none. However, the main empirical studies used for calculating DWL of taxation
(Gruber and Saez (2002), and Kopczuk (2005), being notable examples) tend to employ a panel method,
such that only individuals who continue to report a positive level of taxable income in the personal
income tax base. Individuals who switch to other tax bases, such as the corporate tax base, are excluded
from the analysis. The model in this paper implies that this should exaggerate the size of the income
loss, which would be attenuated since individuals who switch are continued to be taxed at the rate τB .
16This holds if evasion involves hiding income completely from the tax authorities or reporting it as a
part of business operating costs.
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income, for the empirical section I consider these individuals to be members of the self-
employment tax base, on the grounds that they bear the fixed cost of participating in
this tax base. An extension of the empirical study to estimate intensive-margin cross-
elasticities, which would be relevant if I included individuals who report positive levels
of both types of income, is left for future study.
For the purpose of the analysis in this paper, I focus only on the impact of tax reforms
on tax filers. In other words, I do not make spouses a subject of study. However, as will
be seen, information on spouses contained in tax returns will play a crucial role in the
identification of the effects of the Polish tax reforms.
5 Intensive-Margin Responses
Section 3 explained how intensive-margin elasticities and extensive-margin parameters
interact in formulae for DWL. In this section, I employ the variation which arose as part
of the Polish 2009 reforms to estimate responses on the intensive-margin and evaluate
the relevant intensive-margin elasticities.
5.1 Empirical Strategy
The primary outcome of interest is the log-change in taxable income as a function of
changes in marginal tax rates. Following much of the existing studies, the panel regression
specifications for individuals reporting employment income and business income are:
Δ log zkit = ε







where k ∈ {L,B} indicates the tax base under consideration. The variable zkit is reported
taxable income in tax base k, 1 − τ kit is the net-of-marginal tax rate in tax base k.




it) is the log-change in each of the respective variables
between base-year t and year t + s. Consequently, εk evaluates the percentage change
in taxable income as a result of a 1% change in the net-of-tax-rate (i.e. the elasticity of
taxable income).17 The difference s will usually be taken to be one year, although longer
differences will also be looked at to ensure that results are not driven by timing responses.
The differencing operation means that all time-constant variables are eliminated.
However, mean-reversion continues to be a key concern when using panel data to es-
timate ETIs, and could in principle result in the error term being correlated with the
instrument. In line with much of the literature, I therefore include a control for base-
17Income effects are here excluded from the theoretical and empirical specifications for reasons of
tractability. The literature tends to show that these are in fact of low magnitude, and preliminary
results suggests these do not substantially alter the main empirical results of the paper. A detailed study
of their role in the present context is left for future study.
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year income in the specification, fKt (z
K
it ) (see, for instance, Gruber and Saez (2002) and
Kopczuk (2005)). For employment income, this will be a flexible piecewise linear function
of log of base-year taxable income. For business income, due to a smaller sample size, I
will include a linear control in the log of base-year income.
Choice of instruments. As has been widely recognized in the literature, the tax vari-
ables are endogenous due to the progressivity of the tax schedule, individuals who ex-
perience positive income growth will face higher marginal tax rates, resulting in biased
estimates of the elasticity parameter. The variable for the change in the net-of-marginal
tax rate therefore needs to be instrumented. The instrument for Δ log (1 − τBit ) proposed
here is a dummy equal to 1 if the income of the spouse is sufficiently high at time t for
the couple to enter at least the second tax bracket under joint reporting, and 0 otherwise.
The identification of the elasticities in this case comes from comparing the changes in
taxable income for individuals who experienced the higher falls in the marginal tax rate
associated with the middle and top brackets (for whom the instrument is equal to 1)
with the changes in taxable income of those in the bottom bracket who experienced a
negligible fall (for whom the instrument is equal to 0). For any level of base-year taxable
income zkit in the range under consideration, it is possible to find both an individual who is
‘treated’ and an individual who falls into the ‘control’ group.18 For the intensive-margin
estimates, all income variables are deflated using average taxable income growth in the
population, thus accounting for changes in tax rates due to ‘bracket creep’.
The identification strategy can be helpfully illustrated diagrammatically. This is done
in Figure 1, which compares the tax schedules faced by individuals who have a spouse
declaring the same level of income as they are (or, alternatively, are single – the tax
schedules in this case are the same, if I presume tax liability is divided equally between
the couple), and individuals with a zero-income spouse. As can be seen, all individuals in
the middle tax bracket (43,405z l-85,528z l), for instance, who have a spouse at the same
level of income experience a cut in the marginal tax rate (represented by the slope of
the tax schedule), as well as a cut in the total tax liability, represented by the vertical
distance between the new and the old schedules. On the other hand, individuals who have
the same basic income but who have a spouse with zero income experience a negligible
cut in marginal taxes in the same income range, and also a negligible cut in total tax
liability. In this way, the year-on-year change in income for individuals with a low-income
spouse in this income range could plausibly provide a counterfactual for individuals in
the same income range, but who have higher-earning spouses. This is precisely the logic
of the instrumental variable strategy presented above.
This identification strategy is importantly different from that used in Gruber and
18This is possible for the income range zkit ∈ [0, 2 × z̄
(2)], where z̄(2) is the threshold for entering the
middle bracket. Consequently, the estimates of ETIs are limited to this income range. However, this
range spans approximately 95% of Polish taxpayers.
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Figure 1: Effects of reform for individuals reporting who are: (i) single, or alternatively have a spouse
declaring the same income level as the individual (left panel) and (ii) a spouse declaring zero income
(right panel). The blue lines represent the linear self-employment schedule, which remains unchanged
before and after the reform. The red line represents the progressive schedule (for employment or self-
employment) before the reform, while the yellow line represents the progressive schedule (for employment
or self-employment) after the reform. The x-axis represents nominal income, while the y-axis represents
total nominal tax liability.
Saez (2002). Their approach would instead would use instruments based on membership
of the highest two income brackets in the base year. In this alternative strategy, the
counterfactual levels of income growth are provided from non-reform years – in particular,
these are captured by the spline terms in the above regression framework. In terms of
Figure 2, this would involve estimating a pattern of income growth for each income
level on the x-axis using a flexible spline, and subsequently using this relationship and
observed income growth in the group of individuals with income just below 43,405z l to
provide the counterfactual for what the income change would have been above 43,405z l,
absent reform. As will be shown, this strategy is not robust to changes in the pattern
of income growth year-on-year, and may significantly bias estimates where stable income
growth patterns are not observed.
Identifying assumptions. The crucial identifying assumption here is that the spouse’s
income being low enough for the taxpayer to fall into the lowest tax bracket is independent
of unobserved variables driving the change in the taxpayer’s taxable income, conditional
on covariates.19 This amounts to a common trends assumption which should hold in
years outside of the reform, and it is possible to verify it empirically. To this end, Figure
2 plots the average level of income growth for the treatment and control groups of those
19Importantly, this does not require the assumption that there is not correlation in levels of income
between spouses. Indeed, there is considerable correlation between the incomes of spouses in the dataset.
Theoretically, this could be explained by a model in which there is separability between the taxable
income of the primary taxpayer and their spouse.
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reporting employment income for years preceding and following the reform, as well as the
year of the reform itself. Both groups appear to show very similar patterns of income
dynamics in the years outside of the reform for any given income level. In the year of the
reform, however, the group pushed into the second and third brackets seems to have a
discernibly higher rate of taxable income growth, and this appears to be relatively stable
across the income distribution. To illustrate the ‘first-stage’ of this approach, Figure
3 plots changes in the net-of-tax rate among the two groups. As expected, net-of-tax
rates change only slightly outside of the reform year for both groups (any actual changes
arise due to moving between tax brackets among the two groups), while in the reform
year the treatment group with high income spouses experiences a large increase in net-
of-tax rates, while the control group with low income spouse groups experiences a much
smaller change. This variation lies at the heart of using membership of either group as
an instrument for the net-of-tax rate change.
Thus, it would be appear that the identifying assumption holds relatively well. Indeed,
the graphs suggest that the methodology used in other ETI studies (Gruber and Saez
2002; Kopczuk 2005), which assumes a stable gradient of income growth from year to
year outside of reform, would be questionable in the present case. For instance, the
slope of the gradient of income growth in 2008 appears to be much steeper than that
in 2010. Thus, the method would likely have produced a high elasticity estimate using
the 2010 placebo, with 2008 as the baseline year. The method here allows us to sidestep
this problem, as the patterns of income growth for the treatment and control groups are
similar within each non-reform year, even if they differ from year to year.
Sample selection. Since mean-reversion is particularly acute at the very bottom of the
distribution, I will exclude individuals with a base-year income below 20,000z l in 2004
terms from the sample of the employed, and a base-year income below 5,000z l in 2004
terms from the sample of business owners. As in Gruber and Saez (2002), I censor changes
in log income at ±7. This means dropping individuals who experienced a thousand-fold
rise or fall in taxable income from year to year. A person will feature in the sample if
they are observed in both the base year (the year in which the starting level of income
is measured) and the target year (the end level of income, after a suitable number of
years have elapsed). Thus, in principle analyzing differences over one year between 2008
and 2009 will involve different sample of taxpayers than analyzing differences over two
years between 2007 and 2009, if some individuals only started reporting in 2008. However,
restricting the sample to be the same does not significantly alter the size of the estimates.
For both tax bases, only individuals who report income in that tax base in all years
only are included in the sample – thus, all individuals who report some amount of both
types of income at any point are excluded. The same identification strategy is used
both for the employment and business samples. This naturally relies on the sample of
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business owners who chose not to file according to the linear schedule.20 Hence, I make the
assumption that the selection of business owners into the linear tax base was independent
of their elasticities of taxable income, and was driven by, for instance, preferences for
deductions.
5.2 Results
The baseline results for the sample of individuals reporting employment income are shown
in Table 2. The estimated elasticity of employment income εL is 0.218, and is highly sta-
tistically significant. All of the placebo estimates of the elasticity are statistically insignif-
icant, supporting the validity of the exclusion restriction – belonging to the treatment
group only appears to affect income growth only in the year where a significant change
in marginal tax rates occurred (corresponding to Figures 2 and 3).
The elasticity estimates based on a 2-year difference between 2007-2009 is larger at
0.303. Over a longer horizon such as this, individuals who, together with their spouses,
are only just assigned to the treatment or control groups based on their joint income in
the base year, may be more likely to move between the treatment and control groups over
the 2-year time-frame. For the 2-year differences, I therefore I exclude individuals who
are within 10,000z l of being classified differently in the base year, based on their joint
income with their spouse in the base year. These estimates together seem to point that
the long-run response may have been even greater than that suggested by the immediate
response and, crucially, I see no evidence of a timing response (with taxpayers shifting
income between 2008 and 2009), at least in the employment sample. The placebo tests for
2-year differences perform slightly wore than for the 1-year difference estimates: for 2010-
2012 they are statistically significant at the 5% level, although they are not statistically
significant for the other two placebo estimates (2004-2006 and 2005-2007).
The identification strategy used here, together with the large size of the sample of
employed individuals, allows us to estimate the ETI for small subsets of the distribution
of employment income. The results are presented in Table 4. Above the 20,000 z l band,
the ETI estimates show surprising stability, and all fall between 0.20 and 0.25. 21
It has already been mentioned that the methodology used by Gruber and Saez (2002),
which has often been replicated in other studies, relies on assuming a stable gradient of
income growth from year to year. The essence of this methodology is to use non-reform
(usually pre-reform) years to predict what the gradient income growth would have been in
the reform year, absent tax reform. Thus, if there is an unusually flat downward gradient
20In a follow-up project using Polish adminsitrative data, I am pursuing the question of whether
there was selection of higher-elasticity individuals into the linear tax base among the self-employed. As
it stands, the estimates here and those in Kopczuk (2005) suggest a lower and upper bound on the
elasticity of the self-employed population as a whole.
21It is worth noting that this spans most of the employment earnings distribution in the economy, with











































































































































































































































































































































































of income growth in the year of the reform relative to previous years, which may reflect
low levels of mean-reversion in any given year, the Gruber-Saez methodology would assign
this reduction in mean-reversion to the effects of the reform. Thus, the approach would
over-estimate the responsiveness of taxable income to a tax cut.
The results of applying the methodology used by Gruber and Saez (2002) to the
present sample is illustrated in the final column of Table 2. It can be seen that the
result is an elasticity of taxable income which is roughly 30% greater than the elasticity
estimate based on the baseline methodology used here. Given the variation in the profile
of income growth already noted in Figure 2, however, and the nature of the Gruber-Saez
methodology, this is not surprising. Specifically, an estimate of the gradient of income
growth for the years 2004-2005, 2005-2006 etc., is used here to predict the non-reform
pattern of income growth in 2008-2009, and this is I have seen to be steeper in pre-reform
years. As a consequence, this would have led to an under-prediction of the counterfactual
and the higher estimates. In summary, one of the conditions for employment of the
Gruber-Saez methodology, namely stability of income dynamics, appears to have been
violated in the Polish case. The final column in Table 2 shows results of applying the
more recent approach of Weber (2014). Here, the individual’s income 2 periods before the
base-year is used to construct a predicted change in net-of-tax rates in the reform year;
at the same time, the spline in base-year income is combined with a spline in income 2
periods before the base-year. The purpose of both changes is to eliminate any remaining
correlation between the instrument and the error term in the earnings growth process,
which is assumed to have a limited memory form (e.g. MA(1) or MA(2)). As can be
seen, it does align more closely with the baseline results in the first column. Nonetheless,
they are still somewhat larger than my baseline result and, what is more, once we move
to 2-year differences the discrepancy becomes very large. That discrepancies persist is
not surprising, however, as this alternative method also relies on estimates in other years
providing the counterfactual pattern for income growth across the income distribution.
The results for the sample of business owners is presented in Table 3. It can be seen
that although the sample of individuals is much smaller than for the employment sample,
the estimated business elasticity is still statistically significant at the 5% level. At 0.657,
it is estimated at three times the value of the baseline estimate for the employment ETI.
There is more variation in the magnitude of the placebo estimates from year to year
than in the employment sample, which could be expected given the smaller sample size.
However, these never produce an ETI estimate significantly different from zero, which is
what we would expect if the identification assumption holds. Estimating the effects of the
reform over a two-year difference between 2007 and 2009 increases the size of the estimate
to 1.701, with an admittedly large 95% confidence interval between 0.55 and 2.84. While
the estimate is greater than the elasticity of 1.099 found by Kopczuk (2015) for Polish
business owners, the 95% confidence interval comfortably encompasses his estimates.
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Table 2: Own-elasticity estimates for employment sample.
Years 2008-09 2005-06 2006-07 2010-11 2008-09 2008-09
(Placebo) (Placebo) (Placebo) (Gruber-Saez) (Weber)
A. 1-year differences
εL 0.218 -0.041 0.003 -0.008 0.338 0.286
(0.025) (0.033) (0.037) (0.098) (0.031) (0.069)
Number of individuals 100,248 69,461 78,911 100,648 88,349 66,362
Years 2007-09 2004-06 2005-07 2010-12 2007-2009 2007-09
(Placebo) (Placebo) (Placebo) (Gruber-Saez) (Weber)
B. 2-year differences
εL 0.303 0.002 -.0076 0.064 0.551 0.748
(0.036) (0.058) (0.037) (0.029) (0.059) (0.240)
Number of individuals 65,139 49,280 61,618 62,237 70,152 43,764
Notes: All regressions include a 10-piece piecewise linear spline in the log of base-year income as
a control. Instruments are as described in the text. The placebo estimates use the difference in
net-of-tax rates from 2008-2009 for calculating the size of the effect in the placebo years (2005-06,
2006-07 and 2010-11). The sample consists of individuals who reported only employment income
for the years spanned by each estimation, with all individuals who earned below 20,000z l in 2004
terms or above twice the first tax threshold minus 20,000z l.
Overall, these results seem to confirm that the ETI for business owners is likely to be
significantly larger than that for employees.22 Placebo estimates for 2-year differences
are never statistically significantly significant for the business sample (although they are
statistically significant for the 2010-12 difference for the employed), and in magnitude
much closer to zero than the reform-year estimates.
The baseline specifications for 1 and 2-year differences for both workers and the self-
employed are presented in Table 4. Column (2) uses a log-linear form to control for
base-year income in the employment sample, which does not alter the result substantially.
The employment sample is also highly robust to reducing changing the range of base-year
income spanned in the sample (column (3)), and requiring the Treatment and Control
groups to be further away from the threshold of moving to a different tax band (column
(4)). The self-employment elasticity is more sensitive to changes along the latter two
dimensions, perhaps unsurprisingly given the much smaller sample.
In Table 1 in the online appendix, I present estimation results with revenues and costs
for business owners as the dependent variable. Arguably, since there is less incentive for
business owners to underreport costs than it is for them to underreport revenue, a pure
change in revenue could be suggestive of a reporting response. Here, however, I observe
economically significant positive coefficients for both revenue and costs, although the
coefficients are not statistically significant. The standard errors are similar to those for
the coefficient for net income, so the loss of statistical significance relative to net income
22Kopczuk’s estimates are based on a 2003 reform in Poland which introduced the option of the flat tax
for business owners, using a very similar dataset to the present one. The estimate is from a specification
involving three-year differences, and includes income effects.
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Table 3: Own-elasticity estimates for the business sample.
Years 2008-09 2005-06 2006-07 2010-11
(Placebo) (Placebo) (Placebo)
A. 1-year differences
εB 0.657 0.192 0.036 -0.069
(0.287) (0.564) (0.352) (0.201)
Number of observations 6,856 7,033 6,730 7,831
Years 2007-09 2004-06 2005-07 2010-12
(Placebo) (Placebo) (Placebo)
B. 2-year differences
εB 1.701 0.251 0.249 0.018
(0.586) (0.779) (0.529) (0.273)
Number of observations 6,392 6,679 6,445 7,423
Notes: The sample consists of individuals who reported only business
income, with all individuals who earned above 10,000z l in 2004 terms, or
above twice the first tax threshold minus 5,000z l. The log of base-year
income is used as a control in all regressions.
seems to arise due to the estimation coefficients being lower in magnitude. If interpreted
as evidence of a response in costs, these results are consistent with at least some of the
increases in self-employment income being driven by a rise in business activity. On the
other hand, since the response of revenue appears to be smaller than that of overall
income, self-employed may have responded to the reform by reporting higher margins,
which would suggest that the response cannot stem from real activity alone. 23
6 Extensive-Margin Responses
Having estimated the intensive-margin responses to the 2009 tax reform, I now turn to
estimating the extensive-margin parameters identified in Section 3. The relevant depen-
dent variable for estimating the size of the extensive-margin response to reform according
to the model in Section 3 is the change in the probability of reporting any income in a
given tax base. Based on a linear approximation around a starting threshold value of
fixed costs φ̃Oldθ , we know that the change in the proportion reporting business income as





















23The same analysis cannot be conducted for employees, as there is a statutorily-set notional amount
of costs a taxpayer is allowed to report in each year. In general, since employment income is subject to
double reporting to tax authorities - from the individual and the employee - it could be hypothesized
that the reporting response of self-employment comprises an upper bound for the degree of reporting
responses for employment.
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Table 4: Elasticity estimates for different parts of the income
distribution.
Income interval (z l)
Employment 20k-25k 25k-30k 30k-35k 35k-40k 40k-45k
2008-09 0.218 0.207 0.252 0.251 0.207
(0.044) (0.040) (0.068) (0.084) (0.168)
Self-employment Bottom 50% Top 50%
2008-09 0.071 0.845
(0.670) (0.293)
Notes: The employment-sample regressions include a 10-piece linear
spline in log base income, while the self-employment sample regressions
include log base income. The self-employment sample is divided around
the median level of income in the sample in the base year, and the
elasticity estimates are given for the bottom 50% and the top 50%. The
median level of income is 24,912z l in 2008 (in 2008 values).
From our model, I know that a local change in tax policy affects utility only through the





θ ), i.e. the size of the change in relative taxation for type θ. An empirical
analogue of this proposed here is the linear probability model
















original value, and ςit is an innovation term capturing other factors which may induce an
individual to change tax bases from year to year.





features in the formulae present in Section 3. In principle, any estimate of changes in the
share of individuals reporting in the employment tax base is a local estimate, around the
density of fixed costs at which individuals are indifferent. For the purpose of calculating
the DWL of the 2009 reform, the change in the share of individuals reporting within the
employment tax base is precisely what is required. The main approximation used here
will be that, as with the intensive-margin elasticities, the parameter is constant regardless
of the level of income declared by any individual. However, for purposes of calculating
an optimal tax schedule, a departure from the local estimated density may be necessary.
Ib Section 8, the precise parametric assumptions about this are made explicit.
Finding the simple change in the fraction of individuals reporting business income
around the time of the 2009 reform may of course be inappropriate as an estimate of the
effect of the reform, however, as the term ςit may contain other factors driving switching










. For instance, an individual who
incurs a negative income shock in the employment tax base may face a lower tax liability,
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but may also be more likely to switch to self-employment. Instead, for identification of
the effect, I focus on transitions occurring between the employment and business tax
bases for which suitable treatment and control groups may be constructed. If I assume
that an individual only has a choice between business and employment income, and
there is no entry or exit into reporting any income at all, the following describes the
relationship between the change in the fraction of employment income between t and
t + s and transitions between bases
4Pr(baseit = L) = Pr(trans
B→L
it+s ) × Pr(baseit = B) −
−Pr(transL→Bit+s ) × Pr(baseit = L). (6)
where baseit = K means belonging to tax base K at time t, and trans
B→L
it+s refers to
a transition from the business tax base to employment. Accordingly, I will separately
estimate the two components Pr(transB→Lit+s ) and Pr(trans
L→B
it+s ) and use them to back
out the total change in reporting probability 4Pr(baseit = L).
6.1 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I estimate an equation of the form (5) for both Pr(transB→Lit+s ) and
Pr(transL→Bit+s ). If the self-employment tax schedule does not change significantly, the











This is true in the context of the 2009 reform, for instance if I focus on individuals who
file under the linear schedule (and did not experience a change in the schedule at all)
or individuals filing under the progressive schedule with a low-income spouse, thereby
avoiding falling into a higher tax bracket pre-reform (and experiencing a 1% fall in the
marginal tax rate in both employment and self-employment schedules).24 Specifically, I
estimate linear probability models
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where zL,Pit+s is predicted employment income in year t + s, 1{t ≥ 2009} is a dummy for a
post-reform year and 1{i ∈ T} is a dummy for belonging to a suitably defined treatment
group. The difference s used here will be two years. This is to allow for individuals who
24The component 4TBt (z
B
it ) is accounted by predicting the change in income and applying the predicted
(unchanged) tax schedule to this new level of income. The predicted income will be inflated by average
income growth in the intervening period, as in Gruber and Saez (2002). Based on the results of the
Heckman selection model presented in Section D of the online appendix, I do not expect there to be
significant changes in the level of declared taxable income on switching between tax bases. Hence, for
simplicity, I assume that the income declared on switching is the same in both tax bases, after having
been inflated.
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transition gradually between tax bases, and to take into account the one-year grace period
required by Polish tax authorities between being employed and providing services to the
former employer. A transition from employment to the business tax base is considered to
have occurred if an individual has begun reporting some level of business income, where
none had been reported previously. Symmetrically, a transition from the business tax
base to the employment tax base is assumed to have occurred if an individual ceases to
report any business income in the next period, but reports some employment income. 25
Employment to business transitions. As has already been mentioned, the key variable
of interest – the predicted change in the total tax liability in the employment tax base –
is potentially endogenous and must therefore be instrumented. For the employment-to-
business transitions, the identification strategy pursued here is analogous to the ‘bracket
creep’ methodology of Saez (2003). In particular, I restrict attention to a band of income





it) is then a dummy for having income predicted to fall above the threshold in
year t + s. This is equivalent to assigning such individuals to a treatment group, while
individuals whose income is predicted to fall below the threshold are assigned to the
control group. The intuition behind this approach is that individuals below the cutoff
are less likely to be significantly affected by the 2009 reform since their predicted income
will not cross the first tax threshold beyond which there is a large change in total taxation.
They are therefore unlikely to experience a rise in disposable income which could change
the relative tax advantages of switching to the linear business schedule. However, they
are assumed to be close enough in unobserved characteristics to the treated group that
they constitute a suitable control group.26






it) is the interaction
between the post-reform and treatment dummy 1{t ≥ 2009}×1{i ∈ T}. It can be easily
shown that this results in a Wald estimator of the form
α =
(











































The numerator compares the change in the rate of transitions in the treatment group
to the change in the control group. The denominator, on the other hand, compares the
change in the predicted levels of taxation between the two groups.
The identifying assumption behind the estimate is that, absent reform, the difference
25Thus, such an individual may continue to receive some employment income. The intention here is
that such an individual must still bear the fixed cost of undertaking business activity.
26The individuals in the treatment group, i.e. above the tax kink, are very likely to experience a change
in the marginal tax rate. Since the bands around the tax kink are quite wide, however, many of those
individuals are also likely to experience a non-trivial change in the total tax rate and, consequently, a
non-trivial change in the relative tax difference between employment and self-employment.
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in rates of transition between individuals immediately below and above the cutoff is stable.
This assumption can be verified by examining the relative differences in transition rates
for the treatment and control groups in years which did not involve tax reform. These
patterns of transition over a two-year lag are demonstrated in the online appendix. In the
post-reform years (2010 and 2012), the patterns of transition are fairly stable around the
first tax kink (although there appears to be a small surge in transitions in 2010 mid-way
between the first and second tax kinks). Between 2008 and 2010, around the year of the
introduction of the reform, however, I observe a significant fall in the level of transitions
around the first kink, and this fall appears to persist between 2010 and 2012.
Business to employment transitions. For transitions from business to employment,
the instrument for an exogenous change in the difference in taxation between the tax
bases is filing under a linear schedule, when compared to the population of individuals
filing under a progressive schedule but with a sufficiently low-income spouse to fall into
the bottom tax bracket. The intuition is that for those filing business income under
a linear schedule, the differential between employment and business tax levels changed
more as a result of the 2009 reform than for those who were already filing business income
under a progressive schedule (indeed, with a low-income spouse, there occurred only a
1% change in the marginal tax rate). The control group here consists of individual filing
self-employment income in the base year in the first tax bracket, such as that there is
almost no change in relative incentives to file as self-employed for these individuals in
the years 2008-2009. On the other hand, if at least some of the individuals filing self-
employment income under the linear schedule have high-income spouses (although we
cannot observe this due to data availability), or if they are single but would otherwise
fall in the higher tax bracket in the base year under employment income, there will
be at least some individuals in this treatment group for whom the relative gains from
self-employment fell due to the flatting of the progressive schedule in 2009. Thus, the
relative tax incentives to file self-employment income would have changed significantly
only for individuals in the treatment, and not the control, group. In Figure 6.1, it is
shown graphically that the parallel trends assumption between two groups seems to hold
in the pre-reform years 2006-2008 as far as transitions are concerned.
6.2 Results
The results for the extensive-margin regressions are presented in Table 5. Panel A presents
the estimates for the employment-to-business transitions, while panel B presents estimates
for transitions from business to employment.
Employment to self-employment transitions. The first line reports estimates based on
comparing the years 2008 and 2010. The baseline estimate of α× 10,000 z l at 0.0196
implies that a 10,000 z l increase in the tax burden induces 1.96 percentage points of
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Figure 4: Transitions from business to employment between base year t and year t + 2 for individuals
who file under the linear schedule in the base year, and individuals who file under the progressive schedule
but report with a spouse whose income falls below the first tax threshold.
those reporting employment income to transition to business income. A wider band
around the second kink, which widens the definitions of treatment and control groups,
lowers the estimate somewhat to 0.0162, or 1.62 percentage points in response to a 10,000
z l increase in the tax burden. The placebo estimates from comparing the years 2010 and
2012 are statistically insignificant, and thus do not contradict the identifying assumptions.
The second column leaves out individuals closest to the kink as a robustness check: in
the region of 5k z l above and below for the 30k z l-band estimates and 10k z l above and
below for the 60k z l-band estimates. The baseline estimates in the 30k z l-band are not
significantly altered, although the 60k
Self-employment to employment transitions. The estimate of α× 10,000 z l of -0.0554
for transitions from business to employment shows that, for those who began in the busi-
ness tax base, a 10,000 z l decrease in the tax burden in employment relative to business
would induce 5.54% of those in business income to transition to employment. Again, the
placebo estimates from the period from 2010 to 2012 are statistically insignificant, and
thus support the identification strategy.
We may combine the estimated responses on transitions to and from self-employment,
using formula (6). For simplicity, we may take the level of income of 150,000 z l, where
there is roughly an equal share of individuals in employment and in self-employment. In
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Table 5: Extensive-margin responses.
2008 and 2010 2008 and 2010 2010 and 2012
(1) (2-robustness) (3-placebo)
A. Employment to business transitions
30k z l band around first kink
αL to B× 10,000 z l 0.0196 0.0169 -0.0081
(0.00972) (0.00887) (0.0103)
Number of observations 170,287 101,951 177,292
60k z l band around first kink
αL to B× 10,000 z l 0.0162 0.0079 -0.0005
(0.00464) (0.00247) (0.0042)
Number of observations 375,771 273,631 388,985
B. Business to employment transitions
αB to L× 10,000 z l -0.0554 - -0.0071
(0.0084) - (0.0051)
Number of observations 26,639 - 18,301
Notes: The bands concern the width of the tax kink at the entry to the second tax bracket,
e.g. at 30k z l band means the sample is restricted to those 15k z l below the cutoff and above
(the control group) and those 15k z l above the cutoff and below (the treatment group). Column
(2) excludes individuals immediately around the first tax threshold (earnings within 5k z l of
threshold for the 30k z l band and within 10k z l for the 60k z l band). Column (3) contains the
placebo estimates using the years 2010-2012; otherwise specification is as in column (1).




would be 0.5×(−0.0554)−0.5×0.0196, i.e. 0.0375,
based on the above estimates. In other words, a decrease in the differential between
employment and self-employment of 10,000z l at this income level would result in a total
reduction of 3.75% of individuals transitioning to employment, partly due to increased
transitions from self-employment to employment, and partly because fewer individuals
would transition from employment to self-employment. These results may also be framed





. For instance, at the 150,000 z l
income level where the difference in tax rates between employment and self-employment
is around 6,500 z l, and the fraction of those on self-employment is about 0.5, the implied
elasticity on the extensive margin is ξθ(φ̃) =
6500
0.5
×3.75×10−6 = 0.049. In other words, a
100 percent increase in the tax wedge between employment and self-employment results
in a 4.9 percent increase in those declaring self-employment, i.e. increasing the share in
self-employment from 0.500 to 0.525.
7 Deadweight Losses of the 2009 Reform
This section evaluates the DWL resulting from the reform, as well as the direct effect of
the tax changes which occurred in Poland in 2009 on revenue. The results are presented
in Table 6, and are based on the formulae for calculating DWL presented in Section
3 and extended to a case with multiple tax brackets in the online appendix. On the
28
Table 6: Calculations of DWL of reform.
Tax Base Employment Business
Mechanical effect
1st tax band -20,764,139 -6,755,519
2nd tax band -286,883,745 -48,800,616




1st tax band 3,653,246 1,030,008
2nd tax band 29,700,905 14,927,247
3rd tax band 14,653,178 7,325,887
Total 48,007,329 23,283,143
Extensive Margin
B to E 5,373,097 N/A
E to B 246,611 N/A
Total 5,619,708
intensive-margin, this involves calculating the total income levels in each bracket, and
adjusting it by the relevant tax parameters and elasticity estimates. The calculation on
the extensive-margin is more involved. Specifically, at each income level I calculate the
tax differential between employment and self-employment before and after reform, and
use the extensive-margin parameter estimates to predict the share of individuals at each
income level who would transition as a result of the reform.27
As can be seen in Table 6, the mechanical effects of losses in revenue due to the tax
cuts are 407.5 million z l for employment and 72.5 million z l for the self-employment tax
base. In comparison, the reduction in DWL on the intensive margin are 14.6 million z l
for employment and 7.3 million z l for self-employment. It is interesting to note that the
contribution of the behavioural responses along the intensive margin for self-employment
is magnified by the higher elasticities in this tax base, so that they account for almost
exactly half of recouped DWL but less than a quarter of the lost revenue.
The table shows that on the extensive margin, switching serves to further offset the
mechanical losses of tax revenue. In particular, switching from the business tax base
to employment results in an increase in tax revenue of around 5.4 million z l. A smaller
amount of around 0.25 million z l was also predicted to have stemmed from reduced switch-
ing from the employment to the business tax base. These quantities would imply that,
in the immediate aftermath of the reform, 7.9% of the revenue gains and the resultant
27Specifically, I do this based on pre-reform numbers of taxpayers in each tax base, in 10,000z l bands.
Furthermore, for the calculation of DWL on the extensive margin, I assume that on switching taxable
income does not change. This seems supported by the results of a Heckman-selection model presented in
the online appendix, in which I do not observe large changes in income on transition from self-employment
to employment.
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fall in DWL were accounted for by the extensive-margin response.
8 Optimal Non-linear Taxation
I now examine how the presence of extensive-margin responses and different ETIs affect
fully non-linear socially optimal tax schedules for employment and self-employment, in
a framework in the spirit of Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001). I here closely follow the
extensions of this framework by Kleven et al. (2009) and Scheuer (2014). Here, the
question is: what nonlinear tax schedules the government should impose respectively
on the self-employed and the workers in order to maximize social welfare, subject to
not observing individuals’ type, given different elasticities between workers and the self-
employed, and given fixed costs of self-employment?
The assumptions regarding individual’s characteristics and behaviour are here the
same as in Section 3. In contrast to the model in Section 3, however, I now allow indi-
viduals to be subjected to non-linear taxation, with the possibility of employment and
self-employment income being subject to different non-linear tax schedules. The budget
constraint for each individual is then c ≤ l − TL(l) if the individual earns employment
income, and c ≤ b− T B(b) if the individual earns business income. The terms TL(l) and
TB(b) denote the non-linear tax schedules in employment and self-employment respec-
tively, and are permitted to be either positive or negative (i.e. a transfer).
As is well-known since Saez (2001), the precise form of optimal tax schedules will de-
pend on the empirical ‘productivity’ distributions of individuals, as well as on distributive
preferences, in addition to parameters describing the behavioural responses to taxation.
Here, the distribution of productivity corresponds to the distribution of θ and φ types in
employment and self-employment. It is also necessary to augment efficiency considera-
tions with social preferences. For this purpose, I introduce social welfare weights g̃θ(φ)
and f̃(θ) to the model presented in Section 3, which may differ from the actual densities
in the population and can be chosen to represent arbitrary preferences for redistribution
between individuals of type θ and φ. As before, the cumulative distribution functions in
the population are presented in capital letters F̃ (θ) and G̃θ(φ) = G̃(φ|θ).
Individuals are assumed to have a quasi-linear utility of the form as in Section 3.








. This functional form implies that the parameters εL and εB
have a ready interpretation as elasticities of taxable income with respect to the marginal
net-of-tax rate. As before, the fixed cost φ can be interpreted as the cost of setting up a
business, attitudes towards risk, and preferences towards the flexibility of self-employment
(or, alternatively, easier access to evasion opportunities). The parameters θ and ω̃θ can
be interpreted as the hourly wage rates for an hour worked as an employee or as a self-
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employed individual, respectively, in a standard model of labour supply. In this case,
the parameter ω̃ is a premium (positive or negative) to engaging in self-employment, per
hour worked.
As before, the model allows us to separate the intensive margin decision (how much
income to declare), from the extensive margin decision (what type of income to declare).
The tax base choice for the individual is therefore determined by whether or not their
fixed costs exceed the following threshold φ̃(θ) = vB(θ) − vL(θ). Now, however
vL(θ) = l(θ) − TL(l(θ)) − ψL(l(θ)/θ) (7)
vB(θ) = b(θ) − TB(b(θ)) − ψB(b(θ)/(ω̃θ)) − φ (8)
which are a function of the non-linear tax schedules faced in each tax base.
8.1 Optimal Tax Formulae
The social planner sets the parameters of the tax and transfer system, TL(l) and TB(b),
in order to maximize aggregate utility, with each individual’s utility using using the social
planner’s social welfare weights. The framing of the social planner’s problem follows the
classic approach of mechanism design – we require that each individual truthfully reports
their type subject to the tax schedule (i.e. incentive compatibility holds), and that the
total quantity of taxes and transfers balance (i.e. the resource constraint is satisfied).
The precise statement of the social planner’s problem and its solution is shown in detail
in the online appendix. Here, I only state the proposition summarizing the features of
an optimal tax system thus derived:
Proposition 8.1. At the social optimum, the tax schedule for workers, TL(θ), and the
tax schedule for the self-employed, T B(θ), satisfy
T ′L(θ)
































dθ̂ is the extensive-
margin term. Moreover, at the top of the θ-distribution, it can be shown that T ′L(θ̄) =
T ′B(θ̄)=0, and at the bottom, I have T ′L(θ) = T ′B(θ)=0.28
Proof. See the online appendix.
28With a bounded distribution of skills, a top marginal tax rate of zero is a standard result. Another
classic result, namely zero marginal tax rates at the bottom, does not hold in the numerical implemen-
tation of the formula here as there is a positive mass of individuals not working at the bottom of the
skill distribution.
31
The intuition outlined at the beginning of this paper regarding the interplay of
intensive- and extensive-margin distortions is borne out in Proposition 8.1. The opti-
mal marginal tax rate facing workers and the self-employed of type θ is negatively related
to the parameters εL and εB, respectively, which turn out to be equivalent elasticities of
employment (and self-employment) with respect to the net-of-tax rate:
εK =
1 − T ′K(k(θ))
k(θ)
∂k(θ)
∂(1 − T ′K(k(θ)))
where k ∈ {l, b} deotes the level of income declared in a tax base and K ∈ {L,B} indicates
the tax base to which the elasticity or tax schedule applies. The optimal marginal tax
is also negatively related to the mass of workers f(θ)(1 − Gθ(φ̃θ)) and the self-employed
f(θ)G(φ̃θ). These terms together represent the mass of individuals whose declared income
is distorted as a result of the marginal tax rates, and they scale the size of the distortion
as captured by the elasticities of taxable income. The terms in curled brackets, which
compare the social-welfare weights for all skill types θ̂ below θ with their respective
population densities, capture the redistributive effects of the tax scheme. These terms are
standard in the literature on optimal non-linear taxation (Diamond, 1998; Saez, 2001).
The term A(θ̂; φ̃θ̂), however, only appears as a result of the addition of the extensive
margin. It captures the effect of a small change in tax rates TL and TB on the decision
of taxpayers about whether to declare themselves employed or self-employed. A small
increase in the tax rate on workers, TL, for instance, has the effect of inducing f(θ)g(φ̃θ)
to switch from employment to self-employment. The effect of this switching for each
individual of type θ on the social planner’s budget is the differential total tax rate between
employment and self-employment, ΔTL,B(θ).29
From Proposition (8.1), it can be seen that the intensive-margin elasticities matter for
both the DWL and optimal tax calculations. It can also be seen that, for the extensive
margin, the relevant estimable parameters for the DWL and the optimal tax formulae
are somewhat different. In particular, for the DWL, I require an estimate of all of the
transitions to the business tax base as a result of the tax reform, weighted by the tax
differential between the bases. For the optimal tax calculations, however, what is required
is an estimate of the probability of transitions at each point in the θ-distribution as a
result of a small change in the tax schedule. The goal of the remaining sections of this
paper is to use the optimal tax formulae in Proposition 8.1 to make predictions about
the optimal tax schedules for employment and self-employment for empirically plausible
29These results replicate the findings of Scheuer (2014), Proposition 4, those in Kleven et al. (2009),
Proposition 8.1, and are also analogous to the intuitive derivation of the DWL for the Polish tax reform
analyzed in Section 3. In contrast to the DWL formulae in Section 3, the optimal tax formulae require
the entire set of probability densities, g(.), and not just estimates locally around the point where the
reform is happening. The precise way in which these densities are calibrated in this paper is outlined in
Section 8.2.
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values of the parameters.
8.2 Calibration
I now in turn present the calibration of each parameter required to make quantitative
predictions using Polish tax data and estimates from Sections 5 and 6. For clarity, the
complete set of parameter values chosen is summarized in Table 10 in the online appendix.
Elasticities of taxable income εL and εB. The elasticities of taxable income for workers
and the self-employed are set to the baseline estimates from Section 5. I therefore set εL
to be 0.2, and εB to be significantly higher at 0.6.
Distribution of ‘skill’ parameter θ and log ω̃. Following the method introduced by
Saez (2001), I identify the distribution of θ from the observed income distribution for
workers and the self-employed using tax data for the year 2007 in Poland. The method
involves calibrating the skill distribution such that, given the utility function chosen and
the actual tax schedule, the resulting income distribution replicates the observed earnings
distributions in the two tax bases. From the first-order conditions for taxable income in
both tax-bases, it is easy to show that, conditional on an individual of type θ being in
either the employment and self-employment tax base, log(θ) can be related to taxable














log(1 − τBi,2007) − log(ω̃)
In other words, in order for the distribution of θ to replicate the observed income distri-
butions, I can simply calculate θ for each individuals by using the formulae above.
Estimating θ for each employed individual is straightforward given the elasticity es-
timate for workers, observed income and marginal tax rates. For the self-employed,
however, this is complicated by the term ω̃, which I have noted could be interpreted as
a form of a ‘wage premium’ on self-employment income, and which has not so far been
estimated. Here, I examine several plausible values for ω̃. The precise calibration has
a large impact on the predicted self-employment incomes for each θ. For instance, a
value of -2.0 tends to predict higher levels of self-employment income than employment
income, especially at the higher values of θ in the range considered. On the other hand,
-2.5 predicts self-employment income to be significantly lower for most of the distribution
of θ than ω̃ = −2.0, while being slightly higher at the very top. A value of ω̃ = −3.0
predicts significantly lower self-employment income for individuals on transitioning. In
the online appendix, I show that transitioning from employment to self-employment does
not result in a dramatic change in income, or result in an increase in reported income,
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suggesting that -2.0 is the most plausible parameterisations.30
Distribution of fixed costs φ. The fixed costs of declaring self-employment income are
assumed to be Pareto distributed. In particular, following similar previous quantitative
explorations of models of optimal taxation with extensive-margin responses 31, the func-
tional form of the cumulative density function is assumed to have a constant elasticity of
the fraction of individuals in self-employment with respect to the fixed cost of transition.










if φ ∈ {φ, φ}
1 if φ > φ
(9)
The distribution has three parameters, all of which require calibration: the elasticity η,
as well as the bottom and top limits of the distribution of fixed costs {φ, φ}.
The bottom cut-off for the distribution of the fixed cost is arbitrarily set to −10, 000z l.
This allows there to be a benefit to being self-employed for some individuals in the lower
tail of the distribution of fixed costs. As a result, it helps the model to account for there
being a net utility loss (absent fixed costs) on transitioning to self-employment at the
bottom of the distribution (something which occurs in the parameterization used here),
while also having a non-trivial proportion of individuals reporting to be self-employed.
The top limit of fixed costs φ and the elasticity η are then calibrated together, sepa-
rately for each parameterization of log ω̃. For the baseline calibration log ω̃ = −2.0, the
value of η is set to 0.45, while the value of the maximum is fixed at 900,000z l. These
values guarantees an estimate of the marginal response of transitions to a change in fixed
costs, g(φ), close to the estimate of this parameter in Section 6 (approx. 0 .375 × 10−6),
at a level of business income equivalent to 80,000z l. This is roughly the mean of the
treatment group in terms of income. A plot of the predicted fraction of individuals in
self-employment for each level of fixed costs φ under the above parameterization is shown
in Figure 9. Interestingly, the parameterization has the capacity to explain the level and
rising share of the self-employed observed in the data in the top half of the θ distribution.
Social welfare weights G̃(.), g̃(.), F̃ (.), f̃(.). As Scheuer (2014) points out, a combina-
tion of weights G̃(.) and F̃ (.), can be used to replicate a concave social welfare function
applied to the utilities of each individual, c − ψk(k/θ) − φ. The presence of fixed costs
of self-employment has implications for the type of weighting which should be used. In
30I use the Polish tax data from 2007 to find empirical marginal tax rates faced by individuals at each
income level, for each tax base. All individuals in the sample who reported positive employment or self-
employment income were used, with individuals reporting any self-employment income being classified
as self-employed. The marginal tax rates were calculated based on an individual’s reported taxable
income and any other information about them, including whether or not they were reporting with a
spouse, had any deductions or whether they were reporting according to the preferential linear rate for
the self-employed.
31These include Kleven et al. (2009) and Scheuer (2014).
34
Figure 5: The shares of self-employed for each θ in the model under this parameterization (blue line)
and in the data (red line).
particular, if the fixed costs are positive, the weights G̃(.) should be below the observed
distribution, G̃(.) ≤ G(.), whereas if they are negative (and there are net welfare ben-
efits to self-employment), the reverse should be the case. For simplicity, since for part
of the range of the distribution φ is negative, and for another it is positive, I assume
that the social planner cares only about redistribution along the θ-dimension. Conse-
quently, I set G(.) = G̃(.), and model preferences for redistribution purely in terms of
θ. Specifically, for assigning weights to individual of different θ-types, I use the weights
F̃ (θ) = 1 − (1 − F (θ))1+ρ which are also used by Scheuer (2012).
The welfare weights can be simply interpreted as the weight assigned to the indirect
utility of each type in the social welfare function and fixed costs faced by individuals. If
the welfare weights F̃ (.) are the same as the observed density F (.), then because of the
quasi-linear utility there are no benefits from redistribution. Thus, if ρ = 0, the welfare
weights will be the same and it follows from Proposition 8.1 that optimal marginal tax
rates will be zero. Following Scheuer (2014), the value of ρ is set to 0.1 in the baseline
parameterization, implying a small preference for redistribution. As a robustness check,
however, in the online appendix I also examine the solution to the optimal tax problem
where the vale of ρ is set to higher values, namely 0.5 and 1.0. The basic results regarding
the differential in marginal and total tax rates are largely unchanged.
8.3 Analysis
Having set out the calibrations for the model, Figure 6 plots against each other the
marginal and total tax rates for each skill type for the case in which there is an extensive-
margin response (shown in blue), and for the case where this response has been switched
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off (shown in red), and where the fraction of self-employed individuals is kept at 0.15
for each θ. The left-hand side panels show the tax schedules for the self-employed, while
the right-hand side panels show the tax schedule for workers. The tax schedules are
represented in terms of marginal and total rates: the top panels illustrate marginal tax
rates and the bottom panels illustrate total tax rates.
The first striking feature is that marginal tax rates on self-employment are not seen
to vary much across the distribution for the income range without an extensive margin,
falling to around 15% at the mode, and thereafter rising to around 20-22% in the 100,000-
200,000z l range. This is surprisingly close to the 19% preferential tax rate observed in
practice in the Polish tax system. For employment income, on the other hand, marginal
tax rates at the mode are higher at around 27%, and subsequently rise to around 40%.
Secondly, the introduction of the extensive margin does not radically alter the optimal
tax schedules in the calibrations used here. In line with what would be expected, without
an extensive-margin response the marginal tax rates on self-employment are permitted to
be slightly lower than with an extensive-margin response. The social planner can reduce
lower marginal tax rates in the case without an extensive margin and not worry about
inducing switching on the extensive margin. The degree to which marginal tax rates can
be lowered with an extensive-margin response present is reduced. This can be seen in
the top-left panel of Figure 6. However, this effect appears to be quantitatively small at
about 3-4% around the 300,000z l mark. Moreover, it only manifests itself in differences
for the self-employment schedule – the introduction of extensive-margin responses barely
makes any difference to tax schedules for workers. The differences in marginal tax rates
for self-employed individuals manifest themselves in a slightly higher level of total tax
rates on self-employment. In terms of total tax rates, the differential total tax burden at
200,000z l is about 4,000z l lower with the presence of an extensive-margin response.
9 Conclusion
This paper addresses two key outstanding questions surrounding the optimal taxation
of employment and self-employment. Firstly, it estimates the degree of switching in
response to differential taxation between the two tax bases, while also contributing to
the literature on the intensive-margin elasticities within each tax base. Secondly, it applies
these estimates to an optimal taxation theoretical framework to ask whether there is a
case for self-employment income to be taxed at preferential rates relative to employment.
The magnitude of the extensive-margin response is non-trivial, with a 10,000 z l ($
2,670 as of May 2017) change in the relative tax burden implying a change in the prob-
ability of a taxpayer filing business income by 3.75 percentage points. This is a sizeable
response considering that the magnitude of taxpayers reporting self-employment income














































percentile of the income distribution). Using a methodology which allows controlling
for time-varying income-growth in the income distribution, intensive-margin elasticities
for the employed were found to be in the 0.21-0.25 region across most of the income
distribution. The self-employed elasticities were found to be roughly three times larger
than elasticities for the employed. The higher elasticities for self-employment were found
to make a disproportionately large contribution of self-employment to the DWL from
the tax schedule present in Poland, and hence accounted for a disproportionately large
contribution to the change in DWL as a result of the 2009 Polish tax cuts.
For the calibrations used here, higher elasticities of taxable income for self-employment
do indeed justify significantly lower marginal tax rates in this tax base. The presence of an
extensive-margin switching response tempers the rationale for preferential taxation only
slightly, at least according to a parameterisation which fits the estimated size of extensive-
margin responses. In this sense, the model appears to rationalize the preferential tax
treatment observed in many countries. In particular, this would seem to provide one
justification for the Polish tax system, which offers the self-employed a preferential linear
tax rate of 19%, with higher marginal tax rates on employment income at the top.
The applicability of these results to other contexts crucially depends on two questions:
1) similarities in intensive-margin elasticities and 2) similarities of the institutional frame-
work around self-employment, which is likely to determine the non-tax related costs of
self-employment. It may be said that the estimated elasticity of self-employment income
here, in Kopczuk (2015) and in Saez (2003) all point to a magnitude of elasticities among
the self-employed closer to 1. These studies focus on quite different countries – Poland
and the United States – yet the elasticity estimates are similar and higher than other
studies that focus on the whole population of taxpayers. Regarding the institutional
frameworks, on the other hand it would appear that in the United States, at least, there
is an apparently more stringent 20-part test to determine whether someone should be
classified as an employee or contractor. While this partly overlaps with the formal test
for Poland outlined in the Introduction, it would appear more stringent. As a result, it
may be reasoned that the non-tax costs of switching in Poland may be lower.
At the same time, the results in this paper do not necessarily entail that the present
tax system in Poland approaches optimality. Different levels of redistributive preferences
would naturally result in different levels of overall taxation and redistribution to those
observed in practice, and there is considerable variation in marginal tax rates over income
implied by the model which are not reflected in the existing Polish system. Finally, as
has been noted in the existing literature on intensive-margin responses to taxation, the
size of behavioural responses cannot really be treated as an exogenous parameter, but
is a function of the rules governing the tax system, as well as the regulation of self-
employment. Thus, improving tax enforcement for self-employment might well be a
further policy tool for governments not considered here. Changes in responses of self-
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employment to taxation as a result of changes in reporting requirements is an important
follow-up to the current project.
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Online Appendix Not For Publication
A DWL of Polish 2009 Reform
In the main text, I show how the extensive-margin transitions affect the DWL of taxation
under a simplified linear tax schedules. Here, I can use an analogous method to evaluate
actual tax reforms such as the 2009 Polish tax reform. These are the formula used to
calculate the DWL in Section 7 of the paper.
To calculate the DWL, I take into account the piecewise linear nature of the initial
tax schedule, as captured by the presence of tax bands. Let l̄1and l̄2 be the threshold
values for entering the middle and top tax bracket respectively, and dτ 1L and dτ
2
L are
changes to the marginal tax rate in these tax brackets. If I assume that the elasticity











dFθ, the DWL associated with




1 − τ 1L
)
l̄1 × dτ 1L +
(
τ 2L
1 − τ 2L
)










































Here, 1{l(θ) ∈ [l̄1, l̄2]} is an indicator for an individual falling into the middle tax bracket,
1{l(θ) ∈ [l̄2, +∞)} is an indicator for an individual falling into the top tax bracket, and
τ 1L and τ
2
L are the marginal tax rates in the middle and top tax brackets respectively.
The expression h̄k is the average income in bracket k, multiplied by the number of in-
dividuals in that tax bracket. The expressions for the extensive-margin response now
take into account how the reforms affect the probability of switching in a non-linear
fashion, depending on whether an individual falls in the middle or higher tax bracket.
The probability of switching is simply the density of individuals at the point of indif-
ference between the two tax bases, multiplied by the change in the income differential




(l(θ) − l̄1) × dτ 1L
)
32In the main text, it is shown that the assumption of constant elasticities across the income-
distribution appears to be in fact plausible.
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Table 7: Own-elasticity estimates - robustness checks.
Years 2008-09 2008-09 2008-09 2008-09
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Employment sample
εL 0.218 0.203 0.229 0.230
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.031)
Base-year income controls Spline Log-linear Spline Spline
First-stage F -stat 35,345.0 36,237.3 41,053.7 50,254.9
Number of individuals 100,248 100,181 149,006 69,680
Years 2008-09 2008-09 2008-09 2008-09
(1) (2) (3) (4)
B. Business sample
εB 0.657 - 0.834 0.400
(0.287) - (0.286) (0.311)
Base-year income controls Log-linear - Log-linear Log-linear
First-stage F -stat 1,503.1 - 1,572.7 1,738.5
Number of individuals 6,856 - 7,172 4,943
Notes: (1) is the baseline specification controlling for base-year income us-
ing a 10-piece spline in the employment sample and a log-linear specification
for the business sample (2) controls for base-year income using a log-linear
specification (3) introduces a lower 10,000 z l cut-off above 0 and below twice
the first tax threshold (previously 20,000) and 2,500z l for the business sample
(previously 5,000z l) (4) requires the join income of the taxpayer and spouse
to be 20,000 z l above the threshold for the Treatment group and below the









for each type θ, for the middle and top
bracket, respectively.
It is well-known that intensive-margin elasticities εL and εB, as well as the average
income levels in the tax bands, matter for DWL. It is important to note that now what
also matters is the change in the probability of reporting employment income captured
in the integral terms in (10). This is a statistic which can be estimated empirically. The
formula in (10) also illustrates that in calculating the switches as a result of the reform,
we ought to weight observations by the predicted differential in tax rates between the
employment and business for each individual.
B Intensive-Margin Results: Robustness
See Table 7.
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C Impact of Reform on Self-Employment Revenue
and Costs
Table 8 provides the results for estimating the impact of the 2009 reform on the amount
of business revenue and business costs among the self-employed. A discussion of these
results is presented in the main text of the paper.
Table 8: Responses of self-employment net income, rev-
enue and costs.
Years 2008-09 2008-09 2008-09
Dependent variable (Net income) (Revenue) (Costs)
εB 0.657 0.236 0.289
(0.287) (0.195) (0.211)
Number of observations 6,856 7,227 7,191
Notes: The sample consists of individuals who reported only
business income, with all individuals who earned below 5,000z l
in 2004 terms, or above twice the first tax threshold minus
5,000z l. The log of base-year income is used as a control in all
regressions. The instruments are as indicated in the main text.
D Effect of Switching on Income
To identify the impact of moving from the business to the employment tax base on
taxable income, the Heckman selection-correction model presents a suitable approach.
In practice, the difference in income between employment and self-employment is only
observed for those who switch tax bases. To the extent that switching is driven by
unobservable factors which are also correlated with income growth, any estimate relying
on those who do actually switch will be subject to selection bias. However, a Heckman
selection-correction model with a suitable exclusion restriction may allow us to adjust for
a term in the estimate of the income change on switching.
Here, we focus on the sample of individuals who were in self-employment in 2008 who
(i) either filed under the linear schedule or (ii) filed under the progressive schedule with
spouses whose spousal income was low enough to guarantee that they were in the lower
tax bracket in 2008. The former group is understood as the treatment group, while the
latter group is understood to be the control group. This is analogous to the methodology
for estimating the effect of the reform on switching from self-employment to employment
presented above.
As in a classic Heckman model, the transition from the business to the employment
tax base is modelled as the Probit model
43
Figure 7: Income change on transition from business to employment.
Pr(transB→Lit+s ) = Φ (γ + g(zit) + δ ∙ 1(i ∈ T ))
where the group T is defined as the individuals reporting income according to the linear
tax schedule. The interaction term 1(i ∈ T ) ∙ 1(t ≥ 2009) will here be treated as an
exclusion restriction. The intuition is that an individual owning a business under linear
reporting is more likely to switch to employment than a business owner reporting under
the progressive tax base with a low-income spouse. This is because they are more likely
to fall into the higher tax brackets on switching than an individual sharing tax liability
with a spouse, all other things being equal.
The model of the income process for the switchers is
Δ log(zi,t+1) = α + βλ
(
γ̂ + ĝ(zit) + δ̂ ∙ 1(i ∈ T )
)
+ f(zit) + ξi,t+1
where λ(.) is the estimated Mills ratio, λ(.) = φ(.)/Φ(.) obtained from the estimated
first-stage regression, f(.) is a flexible spline in base-year income. The results to this
estimation procedure are presented in Table 9, and the predicted levels of income on
transition are shown in Figure 7.
E Social Planner’s Problem
I here present the social planner’s problem regarding the optimal nonlinear tax policy,
which is used to derive the optimal tax formulae in Proposition 8.1.
By the revelation principle, any tax mechanism can be replicated by a tax mechanism
which induces truthful revelation of individuals’ types. The choice of the tax schedule by
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Table 9: Heckman model of changes in income on transition between tax bases.
Heckman OLS (non-switchers) OLS (switchers)
Base-year (log) taxable income spline 1 0.202 0.319 0.195
(0.0653) (0.0150) (0.0295)
Base-year (log) taxable income spline 2 0.860 1.115 1.014
(0.122) (0.0402) (0.0875)
Base-year (log) taxable income spline 3 1.214 1.050 1.188
(0.247) (0.0814) (0.188)
Base-year (log) taxable income spline 4 0.586 1.020 0.743
(0.408) (0.131) (0.279)
Base-year (log) taxable income spline 5 1.204 1.168 1.258
(0.188) (0.0611) (0.0900)
Base-year (log) business income spline 1 -0.00459 -0.0257 -0.0763
(0.0983) (0.00966) (0.0140)
Base-year (log) business income spline 2 -0.381 -0.186 -0.468
(0.177) (0.0391) (0.101)
Base-year (log) business income spline 3 -0.363 -0.159 -0.650
(0.390) (0.0915) (0.302)
Base-year (log) business income spline 4 -0.930 -0.390 -0.323
(0.780) (0.166) (0.459)




Constant 7.738 6.305 7.750
(0.596) (0.124) (0.247)
Observations 25,704 25,704 3,575
Standard errors in parentheses
the social planner can then be framed as an assignment of a level of consumption c(.), busi-
ness income b(.), and employment income l(.) to each individual of type [θ, φ]. There are
three sets of incentive-compatibility constraints a social planner must take into account
when setting the tax schedules, to ensure truthful reporting. Specifically, conditional
on occupational choice, each type θ must prefer to select truthful consumption-income






















∀θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ (12)
At the same time, the threshold cost for entrepreneurship must satisfy the condition
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φ̃(θ) = vB(θ) − vL(θ) discussed in the main text, for all θ ∈ Θ.
Differentiating the expressions for indirect utility in the main text (equations (7) and




















∀θ ∈ Θ (14)
It can be shown that the incentive constraints (11) and (12) are satisfied if and only if
two conditions are satisfied: the above envelope conditions hold and the functions b(θ)
and l(θ) are non-decreasing (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, theorems 7.2 and 7.3). 33
To incorporate the social planner’s preferences for redistribution, I add social welfare
weights expressed by the cumulative distribution functions G̃(φ) and F̃ (θ), with cor-
responding marginals g̃(φ) and f̃(θ). Such welfare weights are an alternative to using
social welfare functions to capture preferences for redistribution.34 To create a rationale
for taxation in the present model, with utilities additive in consumption, these must differ
from the actual densities in the population. They can be chosen to represent arbitrary
preferences for redistribution between individuals of type θ and/or φ.
We are now in a position to represent the social planner’s problem. We can replace
consumption as a control variable by using the indirect utilities, thus leading to the set
of choice variables {b(θ), l(θ), vL(θ), vB(θ), φ̃θ}. In this case, the social planner will seek


















such that the incentive-compatibility constraints (13), (14) and φ̃(θ) = vB(θ)− vL(θ) are















The resource constraint simply ensures that the total level of consumption in the
economy is less than or equal to the total resources produced by the self-employed and
the workers.
Screening problems with more than one dimension have generally been recognized to
33Whether the functions b(θ) and l(θ) are in practice non-decreasing needs to be verified. The dis-
tribution of skills may then result in a distribution of incomes with either bunching or a gap in the
distribution of incomes. As is common in the literature (see e.g. Scheuer (2014)), I proceed with the
assumption of no bunching and show that it does not apply for a variety of parameter values.
34Saez and Stantcheva (2016) explain the relationship between such weights and the social welfare
function approach in detail.
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pose significant methodological problems, as the standard first-order approach used by
Mirrlees (1971) and much of the subsequent literature may no longer be valid. This is
because the incentive-compatibility constraints must account for the ability of agents to
deviate along more than one dimension of type. Here, double-deviation (for instance, a
change in tax base associated with a change on the intensive-margin) is not a concern,
since at a given declared earnings are allowed to change optimally, within a given tax
base.
E.1 Proof of Proposition 8.1
To recapitulate what is stated in the main text, the social planner’s maximization problem
is that of maximizing utility subject to truthful revelation by each type of individual, and
subject to the resource constraint that all consumption is no greater than the output of







































∀θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ (17)
















with variables defined in the main text in Section 8. Here, we have also introduced the
notion of an ‘original wage’ in self-employment e(θ), defined as e(θ) = b(θ)/ω̄. This
can be interpreted as the additional level of income generated by an extra hour of self-
employment.
Truthful revelation is ensured by three incentive-compatibility constraints, two on the
intensive-margin for each tax base, (16) and (17), and one on the extensive margin, (18).
The first two are derived from the first-order conditions of individuals optimally choosing
the amount of taxable income to declare in each tax base, while the latter is derived from
the threshold condition at which an individual is indifferent between the two tax bases.
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The social planner’s objective function involves purely the social welfare weights assigned
to the indirect utilities, as well as to the fixed costs faced by individuals. It is important
to note that in this derivation, we use the assumption that the level of taxable business
income b(θ) is equal to the premium for self-employment multiplied by the ‘original wage’
in self-employment, e(θ). In other words, b(θ) = ω̃e(θ). This simplifies considerably the
derivations.
Having applied integration by parts to (16) and (17), and incorporating the fact that




, the resulting Lagrangian







































































The social planner is assumed to be maximizing the Lagrangian by assigning levels of
taxable income to individuals of each type, subject to truthful revelation and optimization
on the extensive margin, while also assigning levels of indirect utility to each type. This
procedure yields the same result as if the social planner simply set appropriate taxes
and transfers, and allowed individuals to respond to them optimally on the intensive
and extensive margins. Thus, the control variables of the problem are {b(θ), l(θ), vL(θ),
vB(θ), φ̃θ}. We derive the first-order conditions for each of these accordingly.
The first-order conditions for vB(θ) and vL(θ) are, respectively:
μB
′


















b(θ) − cB(θ) − (l(θ) − cL(θ))
]
We define the term ΔT (θ) = TB(θ)−TL(θ) = b(θ)− cB(θ)− (l(θ)− cL(θ)) as the tax
differential between self-employment and employment. Integrating the above first-order
conditions, the definition for ΔT (θ) and the transversality conditions to maximization





















f(θ) − λRCg(φ̃θ)f(θ)ΔT (θ)
]
dF̃ θ
Adding the two conditions yields the result that λRC = 1. We incorporate this insight


















f(θ) − g(φ̃θ)f(θ)ΔT (θ)
]
dF̃ θ




































































It is easy to rearrange this first-order conditions and introduce terms representing
the elasticities of taxable income for the employment and self-employment tax bases.


































Since the elasticities of self-employment income with respect to the net-of-tax rate,












respectively, we can immediately substitute them into the earlier expressions.
Finally, we may substitute into the first-order conditions for e(θ) and l(θ) the terms for
the Lagrange multipliers on the incentive-compatibility constraints from the first-order
conditions for the levels of indirect utility vB(θ) and vL(θ). This gives the conditions in
Proposition 8.1:
T ′B(θ)








































The limit conditions TB(θ) = TL(θ) = 0 and TB(θ̄) = TL(θ̄) = 0 are a consequence
of evaluating at θ and θ̄, and applying the transversality conditions μB(θ) = μL(θ) = 0
and μB(θ̄) = μL(θ̄) = 0. 
E.2 Incorporating an intensive switching margin
An extension of the above model introduces a third category of reporting, namely report-
ing both positive employment and self-employment income. Here, I consider two types of




), and one for




). The model here assumes
that such an individual pays fixed costs of reporting both types of income if they wish to
report positive amount of each, and having paid these may alter both levels of income on
the intensive margin in response to changes in the relative tax treatment of these types
of income.
Following an analogous derivation to the one above, for those who report both types
of income, FOCs of Lagrangean can be shown to be:
TL,Bb (θ)











× A(θ) × B(θ)
TL,Bl (θ)












× A(θ) × B(θ)
where εk,1−T L,Bj
is the intensive-margin elasticity of income in the tax base k with respect
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ΔT j,k(θ̂) represent the difference in total taxation of type θ between tax base j and k.
It can be seen that with a 0 cross-elasticity between the two tax bases, the formulae
above reduce to the formulae in the previous section. For those who report only business
and only labour income, the optimal tax formulae are analogous to those in the previous
section, where only own-elasticities matter on the intensive-margin:
TBb (θ)



























































































where, SB(θ) and SL(θ) represent shares reporting self-employment and employment,
respectively. The only additional complication is that now there are three ‘bases’ between
which there is switching: the employment tax base, the self-employment tax base, and
the tax base of those who report both types of income.
F Robustness: Social Welfare Weights
Here, I explore the impact of varying the core parameter for preferences for redistribu-
tion, ρ. The baseline parameterisation, setting ρ = 0.1, is somewhat arbitrary, and in
practice a social planner may have greater preferences for redistribution. Figure 8 illus-
trates the optimal marginal and total tax rates for the two tax bases for the baseline
parameterisation, as well as for ρ set to 0.5 and 1.0.
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Table 10: Calibration of key parameters.
Parameter Value Source
εL 0.2 Table 2.
εB 0.6 Table 3.
log ω̃ -2 See discussion in text.
f(θ), F (θ) See online appendix Polish tax data.
η 0.45 Table 5, business shares.
φ̄ 900,000 z l Table 5, business shares.
φMIN -20,000 z l Arbitrary bottom cut-off.
ρ 0.1 Scheuer (2014)
Interestingly, the implication of increasing preferences for redistribution has an effect
of increasing marginal tax rates relative to the baseline for both the self-employment and
employment schedule, but to a large extent the wedge between the employment and self-
employment tax base is preserved. The exception to this pattern can be seen in the middle
panel, where I observe that the difference in marginal tax rates between employment and
self-employment is increased relative to the baseline for values of θ between 0 and 5,000.
While the marginal tax rates for ρ = 0.5 preserve something of the U-shape of the
baseline regression, for ρ = 1.0, preference for redistribution are such that marginal tax
rates are declining almost completely along the θ-distribution. Analogously to the case of
marginal tax rates, the wedge in total tax rates between employment and self-employment
also appears to be to a large extent similar for all three parameterisations. Naturally of
course, total tax rates increase for both bases to finance greater positive transfers at the
very bottom of the θ-distribution (total tax rates below 0 here of course represent positive
transfers).
G Calibration and Optimal Tax Formulae
G.1 Calibration
Here, I provide additional illustration of the calibrations used in the paper. Figure 9
illustrates the cumulative distribution function of fixed cost of self-employment under
the baseline calibration. It should be clear from the graph that a certain fraction of
individuals would choose to be self-employed even if there were no net utility gains from
self-employment (absent fixed costs), since they derive a positive gain from being in self-
employment. Figure 10 illustrates the predicted density of skills θ for different values of
the parameter log ω̃. Under all calibrations, the mode of the skill distribution is located
at around 300k z l. Figure 11 illustrates how predicted income for self-employment and
employment changes for each skill type at each calibration of log ω̃, and also how the
shares of self-employed change for each value of the parameter θ. Finally, Figure 12


















































Figure 9: The CDF of fixed costs under the baseline parameterization log ω̃ = −2.0.
Figure 10: The predicted distribution of θ for each calibration.
under different values of the redistribution parameter ρ.
G.2 Comparison of Optimal Tax Rate Schedules with Existing
Literature
It is instructive to compare the profile of marginal and total tax rates found in the paper
with the profiles usually found in optimal tax simulations. Similarly to the simulations of
Saez (2001), the zero-marginal tax rate at the bottom result does not obtain, as even at
the bottom there is a positive mass of individuals supplying zero income at the bottom of
the distribution. However, since the distribution of θ is bounded, the marginal tax rates
are zero at the top of the distribution of θ (this is not visible in the top-left panel, as the
x-axis is restricted to a subset of the income range spanning all individuals). Additionally,
marginal tax rates are seen to decline from a relatively high level for both employment
and self-employment until they reach the mode of the skill distribution, and increase
thereafter. Such a U-shaped pattern of marginal tax rates has been discussed at length
by Diamond (1998), and is also a feature of the simulations in Saez (2001). A high density
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Figure 11: The left panel shows the predicted income levels in self-employment and in employment for
individuals of type θ ∈ [0, 30000]. Calculations for self-employment use three different calibrations for
log ω̃, namely -2.0, -2.5 and -3.0. The panel on the right shows the implied shares of individuals of each
type declaring self-employment for each calibration.
Figure 12: Comparison of actual density of the productivity parameter, θ, with welfare
weights assigned by a social planner with increasing preferences for redistribution.
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of individuals around the mode implies large welfare losses of high marginal tax rates due
to intensive-margin responses, creating a rationale for increasing marginal tax rates lower
down the income distribution (and effecting high total tax rates for individuals higher
up the distribution, without at the same time creating intensive-margin distortions). On
the other hand, as the modal skill is passed, there is a declining ratio of individuals at
the point of distortion relative to the mass of individuals higher up, creating a rationale
for increasing marginal tax rates. At the very top, this rationale disappears, and I arrive
at the zero top marginal tax rate result.
H Deadweight losses under evasion
Suppose now individuals have an additional opportunity to either hide some of their
income x or to report it as business costs. As a result, if they are reporting business
income their utility now takes the form:
u(c, b; θ) = b − τB(b − x) − ψ
B(b/(ω̃θ)) − λ(x) − φ (20)
The amount of taxed income is now z = b − x. However, this evasion behaviour incurs
a cost given by the convex function λ(.). We assume that the utility function for an
individual who remains in the employment sample is unchanged from before.
We now explore the implications this availability of avoidance behaviour has for the
DWL of taxation. The agent optimally sets the marginal cost of not reporting 1z l less to
the tax authority or reporting it as costs, namely λ′(x), equal to the marginal private value
of doing so, namely τB, the amount of tax not paid. At the same time, the agent also works
to the point where their marginal disutility of earning another z l, 1/(ω̃θ) × ψB ′(b/ω̃θ))
equals the marginal cost of doing so, 1 − τB.
Since the agent is already optimising, a change in marginal tax rates has no impact
on the welfare of the agent. This is a result of the envelope theorem. The marginal
social cost of reducing earnings and reporting less income is given purely by the marginal
social value of the tax revenue earned. The relevant parameter to estimate this is not the
elasticity of all income, but only the elasticity of taxable income, z = b− x. In the above
case, this is ∂z(θ)
∂τB










It may be noted that this is the case either when the individual is reporting income
as costs, or if they are hiding their income completely.
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